I know you guys love talking tariffs and economics—and apparently, I can’t help writing the occasional short novel on the subject. So strap in.
This is speculation on my part, based on how events have been unfolding. That said, with Trump, policy often mirrors whoever got in his ear last—so if Navarro shows up today, the entire approach could flip by dinner.
Still, it looks like the administration is preparing to roll back the China tariffs significantly—potentially cutting them from 145% to somewhere between 50% and 65%. That’s not just a recalibration—that’s a substantial reversal.
Let’s not pretend 50% is some kind of compromise. For small businesses that rely on imported goods or components, it’s still a disaster. They can’t absorb those kinds of costs, and if this holds, a wave of bankruptcies over the next 90 days wouldn’t surprise me. Don’t worry, Walmart’s fine. It’s their suppliers—the small operators trying to stay afloat—that are going to get wiped out. And maybe that was the plan all along. Drive out the little guys, let a handful of CEOs consolidate even more market share, and call it a win for “American industry.”
This entire episode has exposed what was clear from the outset: there was no coherent policy here. It was posturing, and not planning. The assumption was that by hitting hard, markets would panic and foreign capital would rush into U.S. bonds, giving the administration leverage. But instead of reinforcing our position, capital pulled back from both equities and debt markets. They gambled on predictability—and got caught with their pants down.
Now comes the quiet retreat. China’s signaling openness to talks, but only if the threats stop. Both sides are easing the rhetoric, but the fallout may already be baked in.
And just wait—when the dust settles, the administration will call this a win. They’ll point to a few symbolic agreements and pretend the whole thing was part of the plan. Don’t buy it. This isn’t a victory lap—it’s damage control.
And no, this wasn’t some 4D chess move. Real negotiation starts with clear goals and a plan to get there. What we got was a self-inflicted punch to the balls, followed by a scramble to explain it away. If this is “the art of the deal,” then the deal is badly written.
I’ve said before—tariffs can be useful, but only when they’re part of a broader, disciplined strategy. This wasn’t that. It was improvised, reactive, and economically reckless. If blanket tariffs are going to exist at all, they should be capped at something closer to 10%, and even then, only with a clear purpose behind them. Strategic tariffs—targeted, limited, and tied to clear goals—are a completely different animal from the kind of blanket tariff wall we’ve seen here. One helps you bargain. The other just burns leverage for headlines.
And this circles back to the larger point I’ve been making: Congress never should’ve allowed this kind of unilateral action in the first place. One person shouldn’t be able to unilaterally reshape decades of trade policy under the guise of an emergency. Article I gives Congress—not the President—the authority over tariffs and commerce. It’s time they take it back. Because when that power drifts unchecked to the executive, we don’t get policy—we get chaos with a press team.
Thanks for coming to my TED Talk on tariff trauma.